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known what is that government does to elicit trust among taxpayers. Which government 
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1. Introduction 
The question of why people pay taxes may be as old as taxes themselves, but age has not 
brought us much closer to having an answer regarding why we pay taxes ‘voluntarily.’ The 
seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (“AS”) provided the theoretical underpinnings 
for an answer based on the economics of crime approach (Becker, 1968, 1974). In this approach, 
individuals would evade taxes as long as the payoff from tax evasion outweighs the costs of 
being caught evading. Increasing the costs of cheating – more audits, and stiffer penalties - 
should reduce tax evasion. Despite the elegance, simplicity and wide attraction of the approach 
in the past literature on tax evasion, the trouble has been that the AS model fails to predict well 
the actual behavior of taxpayers.  The average level of taxpayer compliance would appear to 
exceed what the AS model would predict on the bases of existing probabilities of getting caught 
in tax audits and the penalties actually applied (Alm et al. 2010). 
In addition to the inability to explain why observed levels of tax compliance in empirical 
studies and in experiments are higher than the model’s theoretical predictions based on 
probabilities of detection and penalties, the model’s exclusive reliance on incentives may crowd 
out voluntary tax compliance (Feld and Frey, 2002; 2007)1. Moreover, in order to assimilate non-
compliance with tax evasion, the model assumes a clear demarcation between compliant and 
non-compliant behavior, which ignores that tax non-compliance may also be the result of 
																																																								
1 After reviewing evidence from several experiments regarding the effect of incentives on human behavior, Bowles 
(2008) contended that the choice of incentives provides agents with clues about the principals’ beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the agents, which in turn would affect agents’ behavior in ways not foreseen when choosing the 
incentives. For instance, taxpayers may read authorities’ increased reliance on penalties and audits as a sign that they 
are not trusted, and choose to reciprocate authorities’ mistrust by evading their taxes instead of increasing their 
compliance like the neoclassical model predicts. 
2 In the mid-1990s, some Australian investors started investing in certain financial schemes to gain tax deductions; 
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mistakes in understanding tax laws. As a result, what constitutes tax compliance and what is 
considered tax evasion is sometimes unclear even for tax authorities,2 which in turn relates to the 
phenomenon of creative tax compliance where following the letter of the tax law is done in a 
way to undermine the legislators’ intentions when drafting the tax code. 
Perhaps the most salient shortcoming of the neoclassical model is its assumption that not 
all individuals behave like homo economicus. Although taxpayers are modeled as being self-
interested, the model surprisingly assumes tax officials’ behavior to deviate from their own self-
interest to fulfill the goals of the state instead. Had they been modeled as self-interested agents, 
the application of sanctions to tax cheaters would depend on the benefits and costs derived by the 
tax official for reporting and sanctioning non-compliant taxpayers versus the benefits and costs 
derived from not reporting it and instead engaging in an exchange with the tax evader in order to 
get a personal benefit. This situation seems to have been contemplated by Slemrod (2007) when 
asserting that a corrupt tax official would use harsher penalties to non-compliant taxpayers as a 
way to extract a larger benefit for herself. 
The limitations of the traditional model have prompted the search for alternative models 
that may better capture the complexity of tax compliant behavior (Alm 1999, Alm and Torgler 
2011). Theoretical concerns focused on the role of norms in explaining tax compliance behavior 
or attitudes about complying with taxes (e.g. Cullings and Lewis 1997, Schnellenbach 2006). 
Myles and Naylor (1995) combine the AS model with social customs and group conformity to 
account for moral costs incurred by taxpayers for any deviation from the underlying norm. In the 
																																																								
2 In the mid-1990s, some Australian investors started investing in certain financial schemes to gain tax deductions; 
at first, tax authorities granted those deductions, but later reversed course by not only backtracking from granting the 
deductions, but also by accusing those investors of having incurred in tax evasion demanding overdue back taxes, 
interests and penalties. Finally, in light of public outcry, authorities backtracked asking only for past due taxes, 
giving taxpayers the possibility to pay in installments without interests or penalties (Braithwaite Murphy and 
Reinhart 2007). 
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same spirit, Traxler (2010) incorporates tax morale into the AS model as a social norm towards 
tax compliance. This gives rise to a societal interdependence as the optimal taxpayer behavior is 
conditional on other taxpayers’ compliance. Taxpayers may comply with their taxes because 
they feel tax compliance is a duty, which in turn increases the costs of engaging in tax cheating 
(Scholz and Pinney 1995). In turn, the duty to comply with one’s tax payments may increase 
when taxes decrease (Scholz and Lubell 1998a), or when taxpayers trust government and other 
taxpayers to hold onto their side of the tax contract (Scholz and Lubell 1998b). Therefore, 
taxpayers may have an intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes, termed tax morale (Torgler 
2003b, 2006), which is shaped by individual and institutional norms (Torgler 2003b). Unlike the 
traditional model of tax evasion, taxpayers’ rationality is assumed as limited; norms act as 
devices helping individuals to make their own tax compliance decisions (Torgler 2003b). 
Although limited by the still developing links between tax compliance attitudes and tax 
compliant behavior (Halla, 2010) empirical results show plausibly that tax morale may influence 
taxpayer behavior (Alm and Torgler 2006, Torgler and Schneider 2007).   
The main goal of this paper is to increase our understanding of the finding that trusting 
government appears to positively affect tax morale (e.g. Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler 2005a, 
2005b; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009). In particular, it is not yet entirely clear what   
government does to elicit taxpayers’ trust. We are interested in finding out what actions 
governments take that may affect individual trust and which government organizations are most 
likely to produce those actions.  We draw from the recent literature on social capital and 
institutional trust and their concern that treating trust in different government institutions as 
being similar to a general “trust in government”, glosses over the difference by which citizens 
come to trust those institutions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). By posing the two questions of what 
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government institutions do that elicits individual trust in them and which government 
organizations are the ones that would carry out those actions, we contend that tax morale is 
affected the level of trust in government organizations that implement and deliver public goods 
and services to the citizenry. 
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The second section reviews the literature 
on the impact of trust in government on tax morale. In the third section we develop a conceptual 
framework for the avenues in which governments elicit trust and ultimately affect individuals’ 
willingness to comply with taxes. The fourth section presents the empirical analysis and results 
based on the World Values Survey data. The fifth section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Tax morale is defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2006). A more 
inclusive definition is offered by Luttmer and Singhal (2014) who highlight five mechanisms 
through which tax morale could influence individual tax compliance: intrinsic motivations, 
reciprocity, peer effects and social influences, culture, and information. That motivation to 
comply is assumed to be shaped by individual and institutional norms, and unlike in the 
traditional model of tax evasion, taxpayer rationality is assumed to be limited. Using survey data 
from Italy, Filippin, Fiorio, and Viviano (2013) also identify stricter formal law enforcement as 
an institutional factor that can enhance tax morale. 
 Norms act as devices helping individuals to make their own tax compliance decisions 
(Torgler, 2003b). This fits with the more general view of the role of norms as guiding individual 
behavior and reducing uncertainty in exchange (North, 1994). Instead of a single model of 
taxpayer behavior, there is a diversity of behaviors (Torgler, 2003b; Alm, 1999b); with regards 
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to sensitivity to social norms, some individuals may be affected by what others around them 
think (or do) about complying with taxes (Frey and Torgler, 2007) and comply or evade based on 
what others say or do.3 By contrast, others behave as if they were impervious to what happens 
around them and comply with taxes nevertheless, while some would try cheating on their taxes 
regardless of the compliance climate around them. Recent clinical evidence based on a 
physiological marker also points towards a potential link between social norms and tax 
compliance. Dulleck et al. (2016) proxy psychic costs through a measure of heart rate variability 
and find a positive association between psychic stress and tax compliance. 
Given the failure of the conventional utility maximizing model to explain actual tax 
compliance, the tax morale literature has labored to uncover what makes individuals more 
willing to comply with their tax obligations.  A consistent finding in this literature is that trust in 
government positively affects individuals’ willingness to comply with their tax obligations. In 
particular, higher trust in the country’s legal system, the government, and the parliament, have all 
been found to increase individual tax morale (Torgler, 2003a,b, 2005; Cummings et al., 2004; 
Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; and Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; 
and Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) Other factors such as upholding religious beliefs, 
support for democracy, and pride in one’s national origin also have been found to influence tax 
morale in a positive way (Torgler 2005b, 2006). Orviska and Hudson (2003) emphasize the roles 
of civic duty and ‘law abidance’ in deterring tax evasion. Using information from the British 
Social Attitudes Survey they find that law abidance and civic duty can influence tax evasion by 
shifting perceptions towards tax evasion. 
																																																								
3 Because tax compliance can be interpreted to be quasi-voluntary (Levi, 1998; Braithwaite, 2003), individuals may 
also learn social norms on compliance (Ostrom, 1997).  
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Although these reported empirical findings strongly indicate that trusting government is 
associated with higher willingness to comply with taxes, it is much less well-known what is that 
government does to trigger taxpayers’ trust. Two main explanations on how governments affect 
trust may be found in the literature. First, it has been theorized that governments may elicit trust 
when they deliver what taxpayers demand. For instance, widespread support for the programs 
provided by government legitimates government actions and may impose a social norm towards 
paying taxes (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Second, it has been suggested that 
governments that are perceived as being fair may elicit individual trust (Alm and Torgler, 2006).4 
We will review both main explanations next because they hinge on different foundations for how 
governments elicit trust in taxpayers and affect their tax morale.  
There seems to be no problem in principle with the idea that individuals would be more 
willing to comply with taxes when their preferences for public services are met. On closer 
inspection, however, the proposed explanation raises some questions. First, it suggests that those 
who believe their tax monies are spent in ways they do not favor would not be willing to comply 
with their tax obligations. However, under democratic regimes, voters supporting the winning 
party would expect it to implement the policies they favor (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), which 
means that government policies earn trust from those who support them and disappoint and lose 
trust from those voters who oppose them (Citrin, 1974). Thus, it is totally understandable that 
individuals would distrust those officials who implement policies they do not favor. The partisan 
character of government policies, however, goes both ways. If alignment between policy 
preferences and policy choices is assumed to reduce tax compliance, trust in government is 
ultimately not necessary; trust in government is necessary when individuals pay the cost of 
																																																								
4 The presence of referendum institutions could be another potential mechanism through which trust is linked to tax 
morale (Hug and Spörri, 2011). However, this does imply that referendum institutions do not directly influence tax 
morale. 
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policies and do not receive the benefits (Hetherington, 2004) whereas those whose policy 
preferences are met do not need to trust government officials. 
A second aspect arises regarding how governments learn about the preferences of the 
population. In order to deliver policies that would reduce tax evasion governments should know 
what the preferences of the electorate are. However, getting to know population preferences may 
be more difficult than commonly assumed. Considering that a sizable part of the population in 
advanced democracies simply refrains from voting, governments may not be sure what their 
citizens want done especially considering the multiple voting alternatives citizens face even in a 
two-party election (O’Donnell, 2001)5.  
A final point may be made regarding measures of trust in government. If we follow 
Citrin’s (1974) evaluations of trust in government in general and in political government 
organizations in particular (e.g. trust in parliaments, trust in the president/prime minister) we 
may measure not only trust in incumbents, but also satisfaction with the performance of those 
institutions, or trust in the institution as a result of the approval of the political regime from 
which it is part of. Overall, the contention that meeting individual policy preferences would 
affect tax compliance does not appear to be so clear. 
Examining the second alternative of government being perceived as fair as a requisite to 
elicit tax compliance, experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more compliant when 
they have a voice in how their taxes are spent (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993) and have a say 
in how tax enforcement should be done (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1999). Consistent with 
the idea that democracy gives individuals an opportunity to get the public goods they desire 
																																																								
5 When taxpayers face an election between, say, two competing parties, they have at least six alternatives before 
them (O’Donnell, 2001). Voters may either vote for one party, for the other party, casting a blank vote, casting an 
invalid vote, refraining from voting, or adopting some random procedure allowing them to select either or the 
previous five options. In those circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain the message coming from voting from those 
who, for instance, just abstained from voting. 
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(Rohrschneider, 2005), taxpayers tend to be more compliant when they are given an outlet to 
express their opinion about what policies should be adopted. Taxpayers may interpret being 
asked about their policy preferences as a signal that government considers them as partners (not 
subordinates) in governance, and in turn reciprocate that treatment by being willing to comply 
with their tax obligations.  For example, survey evidence from Switzerland found a relationship 
between being allowed to decide on policy matters directly – direct democracy – and being more 
satisfied because of that (Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Those findings complement earlier results that 
in those cantons where direct democratic rights were more developed, the average size of tax 
evasion was smaller (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996, Torgler 2005a). 
In this paper we use the insights from recent findings in the literature on institutional trust 
to develop the hypothesis that it is governments’ direct interaction with individuals that affects 
taxpayers’ trust and ultimately tax morale. Two broad questions will guide the inquiry developed 
in the next section: 1) Which actions do governments take that may affect individual trust? and 
2) Which government organizations are most likely to produce those actions?	
	
Government actions and organizations, trust, and tax morale 
In order to answer the two questions above – which government actions elicit trust, and 
where in government those actions are carried out – we will separate government organizations 
into input and output organizations (Rothstein, 2005). In a nutshell, the input side of government 
is its political side; it converts individual preferences into policies that will produce the goods 
and services that individuals want government to provide. The output side fulfills an 
administrative role of adjudicating the goods and services decided upon on the input side. 
 
The input side of government as builder of trust 
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The input side is constituted by the political organizations of government – the legislative 
and executive branches. Their members are elected to advance the policies favored by the 
electorate who supported them. Therefore, parliaments and the executive branches are controlled 
by the political faction or factions that gathered the broadest support among voters. By extension, 
the policies they advance may certainly favor certain groups over others (Rothstein 2005). For 
instance, a legislature may have to choose whether unemployed people should receive help in 
their predicament versus cutting taxes on businesses to generate jobs. Whatever decision is 
made, it will have different effects on different individuals, likely granting benefits to some and 
imposing costs on others. 
The partisan character of input organizations makes them very unlikely to elicit 
widespread trust among taxpayers. Although it may be argued that those policies - and the 
politicians behind them - seek to serve the common good, the argument fails to consider that 
input organizations and their members would serve the version of the common good that has 
received the broadest support among the electorate (or in the legislature). Moreover, even though 
charismatic political figures may sometimes elicit widespread trust among individuals such 
occurrence would most likely be exceptional because of the partisan character of politics and 
input organizations (Levi and Stoker, 2000). Thus Rothstein (2005) notes that in Sweden - 
arguably, one of the most advanced democracies in the world - people place higher trust in 
government organizations whose members were not elected (e.g. public schools, health care 
system, and the police) than in the representative organizations of democracy such as political 
parties or parliaments. In recent decades trust in input organizations has been on the decline; for 
example, Dalton (1996) reported that individual trust in political institutions was at rock bottom 
levels compared to those from the 1950s and 1960s. 
         Politicians, bureaucrats, and tax morale: What shapes tax compliance attitudes?                      
Another obstacle with the input side of government as generator of trust stems from the 
fact that voting does not necessarily ensure fair results. Madison (1788) observed this 
shortcoming of democracy, and went as far as to say that individual freedoms are threatened not 
only by government actions, but also by the decisions of majorities that might undermine 
minorities' freedoms. Levi (1998) pointed out that the introduction of safeguards to protect 
minorities may reduce the danger of a "dictatorship of the majority", but that comes at the 
expense of generating resentment because of minorities' obstruction of majorities' will. 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that input government organizations would elicit from their 
actions a high level of taxpayers' trust (and tax morale); and this is regardless of earlier empirical 
results (a point to which we shall return shortly). Let us turn our attention to government 
organizations on the output side. 
 
The output side of government and trust 
Output organizations are in charge of delivering public goods and services to individuals 
which are previously decided upon by the input institutions of government. Therefore, output 
organizations are not concerned with what should be delivered, but instead with how those goods 
and services are delivered. Talking about tax compliance, some of the recent literature 
emphasizes building a relationship of trust between taxpayers and the tax administration (an 
organization of the output side of government) to increase voluntary tax compliance (Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). More specific advice on how tax administrations elicit taxpayers’ trust 
includes tax authorities treating taxpayers with consideration and respect, applying clear and fair 
procedures to all taxpayers, and helping them to fulfill their tax obligations. Taxpayers are no 
longer seen as subordinates of the state, but instead as partners of the tax administration that 
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would willfully comply when they are treated according to standards of objectivity, impartiality, 
and rule of law, which are the same principles that make people trust government institutions 
(Rothstein, 2005). When treating taxpayers in such a way, tax authorities deliver good 
governance that is supportive of democratic principles (Braithwaite, 2003). A similar demand for 
good governance applies to other organizations of the output side of government; the concrete 
role of administrative institutions of government (of which the tax administration is one 
example) is supplying citizens with their democratic and social rights (Rothstein, 2005). 
By focusing on building a relationship of trust between taxpayers and tax authorities as 
condition for eliciting voluntary tax compliance, the recent literature on tax compliance 
highlights two elements. One is the role that direct interaction between government officials and 
taxpayers may have in eliciting voluntary tax compliance, and the other concerns how taxpayers 
are treated by authorities. Direct contact between individuals is at the cornerstone of building a 
trust relationship because it provides the parties with superior clues regarding the other side’s 
trustworthiness (Ostrom, 1998). Taxpayers would trust (or distrust) tax authorities as a result of 
their experiences dealing with them in direct interactions. However, tax administrations are not 
the only government institution taxpayers deal with; depending on the way taxes are structured, 
taxpayers may have a more limited exposure to tax authorities. Because other institutions of the 
output side of government should also deliver governance consistent with democratic principles, 
they may also influence individual willingness to comply with taxes. In general, contacts with 
government authorities inform citizens about how the state regards them (Rohrschneider, 2005; 
Rothstein, 2005, 2009; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). 
The emphasis on how authorities should treat taxpayers - according to fair and 
transparent procedures consistent with democratic principles - highlights the role that procedural 
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justice considerations play in making taxpayers accept government authority and decisions. 
Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures by which decisions are made6 (Wenzel, 
2003). Tyler (1988) showed that procedural justice explained why individuals submit to 
decisions made by authorities even when those decisions are costly to them. Individuals do not 
care only about what they want, but also about how they get it; this is what makes procedural 
justice especially relevant. In fact, the issues affecting individuals may exceed their ability to 
understand them (Tyler, 1988; Ayers, 1992), and because of such inability, subjects may instead 
focus on how authorities treated them during the process leading to the decision in order to 
evaluate its acceptance or rejection – they would assess whether they have had a voice in the 
process, whether their arguments have been taken into account in the decision, and so on. The 
treatment received from authorities tells individuals how they are viewed by those authorities 
either as equals or partners, or as subordinates. There is a broad consensus on how issues of 
fairness and legitimacy affect trust in authorities in a variety of arenas impacting: voluntary 
compliance with their norms and requests (Levi, 1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein, 2005, 
2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008); tax compliance (Feld and Frey 2002, 2007; Murphy, 2004; 
Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2007); law enforcement (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); and 
cooperation with authorities (De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). 
The importance of procedural justice may be further highlighted by referring to what 
happens when it is absent. For this, corruption offers a good illustration. Corruption effectively 
undermines procedural justice by making access to public goods and services, to which 
individuals are otherwise entitled, contingent on entering into a private transaction with 
																																																								
6 Procedural Justice is different from distributive justice, the latter referring to the fairness of the outcomes of a 
decision. Political institutions in government routinely make decisions dealing with the fair allocation of resources 
(e.g. who would be receiving a government subsidy, or who would pay what taxes). Individuals may be unhappy 
with what the input side of government (its political institutions) has decided upon, but those decisions should be 
applied fairly and consistently to all of those involved for government to be trusted (Rothstein, 2005). 
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government officials to pay a bribe. Corruption further undermines the democratic ethics of 
equality as well as individual trust (Seligson 2002; Warren 2004). The principle of political 
equality that legitimates elections on the input side – one person, one vote – is neglected by 
corruption on the output side because access to public goods and services becomes contingent 
upon paying a bribe to those officials controlling access to the resource. Under those 
circumstances, it is understandable that those affected by the discriminatory practices enabled by 
corruption would be more unwilling to contribute their taxes to sustain a government unable or 
unwilling to stop corruption.	Discriminatory practices that undermine individual trust are not 
restricted to corruption; favoring or discriminating against certain social groups (e.g., ethnic, 
religious) is likely have a similar effect on willingness to comply with government norms and 
decisions. 
 It is interesting to note that the salience of procedural justice is not limited to the 
relationship between individuals and government, as individuals may derive direct satisfaction 
from fair treatment in general. For example, individuals in the marketplace often care about how 
they are treated (Lane, 1988), and economists have started to explore whether procedural justice 
is a source of satisfaction for individuals in the same way that consumption of goods and services 
increases individual utility. Procedural Utility – the term suggested in that literature - has been 
used to describe the utility derived from the process leading to outcomes (Benz, Frey, and 
Stutzer 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Obtaining satisfaction from receiving fair treatment may 
be the reason behind the experimental finding that allowing taxpayers to vote leads to increased 
tax compliance (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1993; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze 1999; Feld and 
Tyran, 2002; Wahl, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler, 2010); even though subjects may not obtain the 
goods and services they favored, they may value the opportunity to express their opinion on what 
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governments should do with tax moneys. Interestingly, trust among adversary policymakers is 
built primarily on considerations of fairness and legitimacy in the negotiating process rather than 
on the results of those negotiations (Leach and Sabatier, 2005) In supporting our conjecture, 
experimental evidence from psychology and neuroscience shows that individuals derive 
satisfaction from receiving signals of trust, exhibiting unique patterns of brain activity that are 
different from when subjects only obtain positive outcomes (Sanfey, 2007; Lee, 2008, Krueger et 
al. 2007), even experiencing  unique changes in the level of neurotransmitters (Zak, Kurzban, 
and Matzner, 2005). Conversely, subjects also exhibit physiological responses to distrust signals 
(Zak et al. 2005). 7 In summary, there is a confluence of different streams of research towards a 
similar result showing that fairness considerations drive trust and legitimacy and that they are 
likely to be powerful factors in explaining how governments build (or destroy) trust among their 
citizens. 
Finally, individuals do not treat government institutions as a single monolithic entity. 
Instead, individuals value the trustworthiness of different government organizations on different 
bases. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) evaluated whether individuals trust all government institutions 
the same way or they use different bases for trusting in them. Using individual level data from 
the third wave (1995-97) of the World Values Survey (WVS) comprising individuals from 56 
countries, their factor analysis revealed that different dimensions of institutional trust emerge. 
Institutions belonging to the input side of government such as parliaments, political parties, and 
government fall within the same dimension, whereas institutions from the output side such as the 
police, the army, and legal institutions, load on a different dimension. An additional analysis 
																																																								
7 Also in those experiments recipients of trust signals were more likely to reciprocate and trust the other party in 
return, which parallels insights from the tax compliance literature that a relationship of trust between government 
officials and taxpayers would drive compliance up. Thus, the salience of procedural justice in eliciting individual 
trust rests on supportive evidence from different fields that individuals care about, and derive satisfaction from, 
being treated fairly and impartially. 
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using Sweden’s SOM survey produced similar results. Therefore, government is far from being a 
monolithic construct before the eyes of the citizenry; they do distinguish between their roles and 
attributes. 
The different streams of literature suggest that the kind of trust in government that would 
affect tax morale comes from the treatment received by individuals by its output side. What the 
output side of government does affects not only individual well-being, but also gives insights on 
how government regards its citizens (North, 1994). Rothstein (2009) made a compelling account 
of what happens when individuals are treated unfairly by the output side of government, 
“…if the police do not protect you because you are an X-type citizen, if the fire-
brigade does not come to your house because you are a Z-type citizen, if your 
children are systematically discriminated against in the schools because they are 
Y-type children, and if the doctors at the hospital ignore you because you are a P-
type person, then you are in real trouble...what the state does on the output side 
may be life threatening...” (p. 323) 
Governments that allow their citizens to be treated in the way described in the quote 
above do not seem to have high regard for the well-being of their citizens – and taxpayers would 
read precisely that from the unfair treatment received from government officials from the output 
side. 
We therefore pose the following hypotheses: First, individuals who trust government 
would show higher tax morale than those who do not trust it, and second, individuals who trust 
the output organizations of government would show even stronger tax morale. We proceed to 
test these hypotheses in the next two sections.  
        Politicians, bureaucrats, and tax morale: What shapes tax compliance attitudes?                      
 
3. Empirical approach and data 
Basic specification  
The basic model we estimate is given by:  
  (1) 
Where our dependent variable 	is Tax Morale, measuring individual i willingness to 
comply with taxes; specifically, the question in the WVS asks individuals to what extent certain 
actions are justifiable, as follows; 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between (1-10 scale: 1: “never justifiable; 10: always 
justifiable)”…Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” 
Although this is the standard measure used in the tax morale literature, it is not free of the 
general shortcomings of using self-reported answers. A prominent shortcoming is that 
individuals’ answers to the question may not correlate with actual tax behavior8 ; some 
individuals may want to make up for past behavior by asserting high tax morale in survey 
responses. However, the way the question is asked in the WVS may not be as sensitive to such 
individual manipulation. First, it does not intrude by asking past behavior; instead, it is a probing 
question about a hypothetical situation (whether the individual would consider cheating if he had 
a chance to do so). Second, the question appears in the questionnaire in a group of questions that 
																																																								
8 Although the direct relationship between Tax Morale and actual compliance behavior has yet to be developed in 
detail, average levels of Tax Morale in a country appear to be correlated with the country’s size of the underground 
economy which has been interpreted as the impact of Tax Morale on tax evasion (Torgler and Schneider 2007; Alm 
and Torgler, 2006). The same problem affects the neoclassical model of tax evasion; intentions are assumed to be 
known from observed non-compliant behavior, but observed non-compliance may be also due to misinterpretation 
of tax laws or lack of resources when filling out one’s taxes (Braithwaite, Reinhart, and Smar, 2010). 
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asks about other individual attitudes such as - the justifiability of homosexuality, divorce, 
accepting bribes, euthanasia, and suicide, among others – all of which lowers the possibility of 
respondents giving a prepared answer. Other issues contemplated in the literature such as the 
problems derived from using a single question to measure tax morale, are counter-balanced by 
the difficulties in assembling indexes in terms of correlation among components, and deciding on 
the relative importance (weights) of each component (Alm and Torgler, 2006). 
Explanatory variables 
We have first a vector of four variables,  
which are the variables used to test the proposition that government organizations on the output 
side are more salient in driving tax morale.9 In the WVS, the question that asks individuals how 
much they trust different government organizations (and other types of social organizations as 
well) reads:  
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? (4-scale item, coded 1=a great deal… 4=none at all)” 
The four measures of trust in government organizations that we include in the estimations 
are the following: 
Trust in the Civil Service. We use this explanatory variable as a way to measure 
individual trust in government bureaucracies with which individuals may interact in order to 
access their share of goods and services –health, education, social services, and so on. A possible 
limitation of this variable is the extent to which “civil service” actually captures individual 
																																																								
9 We could also use the variable “trust in government” directly but that would not allow us to examine the question 
of whether there are differentiated bases for trusting different government organizations. 
iTRUSTG∑
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experience with the output side of government 10 ; using measures of trust in specific 
organizations (e.g. school system or social welfare) would be a better alternative, but they are not 
available11.Another possible limitation is that “civil service” may be associated in some cases 
with government organizations on the input side of government (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008) 
because their leaders may be appointed by politicians. We expect a positive sign; if individuals 
trust civil service institutions they would be more likely to report higher tax morale. 
Trust in Police. Its role is to protect individuals’ lives and property, detecting norm-
deviant behavior and capturing those suspected of conducts breaking the law. Police actions fall 
right into the realm of procedural justice; in particular, individual protection of individuals’ lives 
and patrimony does not admit exception and capturing suspected criminals should be done 
showing concern and respect for their rights. We expect a positive relationship between trust in 
police and tax morale. 
Trust in the Courts. The role of the courts and the legal system in eliciting individual Tax 
Morale has been explored in previous studies and found to be empirically supported (Torgler 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, Torgler and Murphy 2005). One possible issue concerns the extent 
to which individuals get exposed and involved with the legal system and courts. Unlike with the 
police, the extent to which the common citizen may get involved with courts is limited to those 
with legal affairs to settle. However, the lack of appropriate data has not allowed previous 
researchers and will not allow us either to address this concern. 
																																																								
10 Rothstein and Stolle (2008) contended that trust in Civil Service may be considered as trust in the political 
appointees that are nominated to populate the high ranks of state organizations. If that is the case, then they may be 
closer to political institutions in the input side than those in the output side of government. 
11 Even if we were to have measures of individual trust from several output organizations, we have no way to 
ascertain the relative relevance of each in shaping individual Tax Morale; not only because different individuals may 
interact with different agencies, but also because the international basis of the WVS means different government 
arrangements and different functions. For instance, healthcare in the U.S. is provided mainly by private providers 
with little or no intervention from the government, whereas in many Western European countries, Canada, and 
Japan, the arrangements include government organizations in varied degrees. 
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Trust in Parliament. Higher trust in legislatures has been found in the previous literature 
to increase tax morale (Torgler 2003a, 2004; Torgler and Murphy 2005, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Torgler 2009). The interpretation of the variable is complicated by the fact that trust in 
parliament may gauge not only trust in the institution but also trust in the incumbents (Citrin, 
1974)12 which responds to different political parties. Again, the data available do not allow us to 
discern among these possibilities. Besides the “Trust in Government” variables of interest we 
also include several other control variables: 
Support for democracy (SUPPDEM): Individual support for democracy has been found 
in the previous literature to positively affect tax morale (Torgler, 2003c, 2004b, 2005b; Torgler 
and Schneider, 2007). Moreover, availability of direct democratic practices such as referenda 
increase tax morale among Swiss taxpayers (Torgler 2005a). However, Inglehart (2003) 
examined the issue of how to measure support for democracy and noted that measures of overt 
support may be misleading because a substantial proportion of democracy supporters also 
support non-democratic regime types, even among those living in well-established democracies. 
Consequently, we will use a measure of democratic support where what is gauged is individuals’ 
rejection of non-democratic regimes following Linde (2009).  Those who reject all non-
democratic alternatives offered in the WVS are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive 
effect of “rejecting all non-democratic regime alternatives” on tax morale. 
Religiosity (RELIG):  This variable accounts for individual involvement with formal 
religion, gauged by attendance at religious services. Based on the findings of earlier studies 
(Torgler 2003a, 2005a, 2006, Alm and Torgler 2006, Torgler and Schneider 2007, Torgler and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2009), we anticipate that individuals who reported being religious exhibited 
higher tax morale than those who did not. 
																																																								
12 Even other interpretations are possible here (Citrin, 1974). 
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National Pride (NPRIDE):  Also it has been found in previous studies that individuals 
reporting being proud of their nationality were more likely to report willingness to comply with 
taxes (Torgler 2005b, Torgler and Schneider 2004, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 2009, Konrad 
and Qari 2012). 
Other control variables ( ) were included involving personal 
characteristics of the respondents, which also have been generally found to be significant 
determinants of tax morale in previous studies: gender, age, education level, marital status, and 
employment status.  Finally, note that we use specific dummy variables (COUNTRY) to control 
for country fixed effects. 
The variables to be used in the estimations are listed in Table 1, which also shows the 
item number in the WVS and the expected sign of the regression coefficient. 
 
 
  
Table 1. List of Variables 
Variable  Measure in the WVS   Expected 
sign 
Tax Morale (v200) Cheating on Taxes    
Trust in 
Government 
(v141) Trust in Civil Service 
(v136) Trust in Police 
(v137) Trust in Courts and Justice 
System 
(v140) Trust in Parliament 
 ( + ) 
( + ) 
 
( + ) 
( + ) 
Rejection of Non-
democratic 
alternatives 
 
 
 
   (v148) ruled by strong leaders 
   (v149) ruled by experts 
   (v150) ruled by the military 
  
( + ) 
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l
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Table 1. List of Variables 
Variable  Measure in the WVS   Expected 
sign 
Other variables (v186) Religiosity (attendance to 
services) 
(v209) National Pride  
 ( + ) 
 
( + ) 
Controls 
 
 
 
 
Country-specific 
dummies 
(v235)   Female (gender) 
(v237)   Age 
(v253)   Income 
(v238)   Education 
(v55)    Marital status 
(v241)  Employment Status 
 
 ( + ) 
( + ) 
( - ) 
varies 
varies 
varies 
varies 
 
Data and estimation  issues  
The core data used in the estimations are based on the last available wave of the World 
Values Survey (WVS) collected from 2005 to 2008 for a large number of countries. The WVS 
collects opinions on a large array of topics from individuals living in different countries (more 
than 40 countries in the 2005-08 wave)13 and different political systems from full-fledged 
democracies to one-party governments. 
One relevant issue concerns the differences between political systems because they may 
influence how individuals come to trust authorities. Democratic systems give individuals a 
chance to get their policy preferences implemented through selecting the candidates that propose 
the policies they favor. Individuals appreciate the trust government places in them and in turn 
become more willing to comply with taxes. Voting on how taxes should be spent has been found 
to increase tax compliance in experiments (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1993; Wahl, Muehlbacher, 
and Kirchler, 2010). Thus, higher tax compliance results from government delivering not only 
																																																								
13 Working with data from individuals living in different countries raises the issue of the accuracy of survey 
questions across different languages. The WVS team controls the accuracy of surveys by providing the main 
questionnaire (in English) to each country team which translates it into the local language(s). In turn, the local teams 
submit the local questionnaires to a different translator who translates it back to English; both versions are sent to 
the central WVS team that develops the main questionnaire for approval. 
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goods and services but also from governance practices consistent with democratic principles 
(Braithwaite, 2003a).  This is a basis for trusting government different from the basis used in a 
country without democratic institutions and political competition. Experimental evidence 
suggests individuals have lower tax compliance when they do not have a voice on how their 
taxes are spent (Wahl, Muelhbacher, and Kirchler, 2010). It is for these reasons that we need to 
control for the differences in political regimes in general and between full-fledged democracies 
and other types of regimes in particular. 
To control for the different ways that governments interact with their citizens derived 
from the political system they are in, we will use the Freedom in the World survey produced by 
Freedom House to separate those countries where the political systems are democratic (free, in 
the parlance of the survey) from those whose political systems are different14. The survey ranks 
annually most countries in the world based on the level of political rights and civil liberties 
effectively available to their citizens, which in turn are combined into a single number that, 
among other things, allows countries to be separated into three categories: so-called free 
countries (with scores from 1 up to 2.5), partially-free countries (between three and five) and 
not-free countries (scores 5.5 and above). We run two separate sets of regressions, one with 
individuals from democratic countries which all fall within the category of “free”, and the second 
set is for individuals from the rest of the countries (partially-free and not-free). With that 
arrangement we expect to isolate the different basis for trust that arises from different political 
regimes. 
Table 2. List of Countries  
Free Countries 
Germany  Italy Spain Canada 
																																																								
14 The survey assesses a country’s level of political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by their inhabitants based on 
questionnaires that score how they perform on political rights and civil liberties. Each dimension generates a rank 
from 1 to 7 with lower values meaning higher degree of political and civil rights. 
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Australia Norway Sweden Finland 
Poland Switzerland Chile Slovenia 
Taiwan Uruguay Cyprus United States 
Japan South Africa South Korea Bulgaria 
Mexico Brazil India Romania 
Ukraine Indonesia Serbia Mali 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   
Partially Free and Not Free Countries 
Turkey Moldova Georgia Thailand 
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Zambia  
China  Vietnam    
 
Table 2 shows the list of countries included in each set of regressions. A second 
estimation issue is that we are interested in what makes individuals more likely to report that 
cheating on their  taxes is not justifiable, (that is, to exhibit tax morale). A non-linear estimation 
method is necessary because predicted probabilities may become negative or larger than unity 
when using a linear regression approach (Kennedy, 1993). Because of that we will follow 
previous empirical work and use Probit estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, in the 
estimations we need to use weights to reflect a country’s share of the total sample. Finally, 
because of the way the answers are distributed – on average about sixty percent of respondents 
report that cheating on taxes is never justifiable, and the other forty percent appear scattered on 
the other nine possible values – as customary, we recode the ordinal measure of tax morale into a 
binary variable where one stands for “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” and zero otherwise.  
4. Results 
First we discuss the results for individuals from 29 democratic (free) countries presented 
in Table 3. Our specifications include a number of combinations of our variable of interest, Trust 
in Government. 
Table 3. Trust In Government and Tax Morale - Free Countries 
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Marginal 
  1 2 3 4 5 Effects 
Justice and Courts 
  
0.0310** 
 
0.00459 0.00177 
   
 (0.0125) 
 
      (0.0146)       (0.0056) 
Parliament 
  
-0.00129 
 
-0.0204 -0.00789 
   
    (0.0132) 
 
      (0.0147)       (0.0057) 
Civil Service 
   
0.0129 0.0215 0.00831 
    
   (0.0129)       (0.0147)       (0.0057) 
Police 
   
0.0467*** 0.0469*** 0.0181*** 
    
    (0.0125)       (0.0145)       (0.0056) 
Support for Democracy 
 
0.194*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.197*** 0.0754*** 
  
    (0.0205)     (0.0208)     (0.0209)       (0.0211)       (0.0080) 
National Pride 0.161*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.0580*** 
 
    (0.0120)   (0.0130)     (0.0133)     (0.0134)       (0.0135)       (0.0052) 
Religiosity (attendance to services) 0.0214*** 0.0237*** 0.0244*** 0.0228*** 0.0235*** 0.00909*** 
 
    (0.0046)     (0.0050)     (0.0051)     (0.0051)       (0.0052)       (0.0020) 
Gender (female) 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.0486*** 
 
    (0.0176)     (0.0190)     (0.0194)     (0.0194)       (0.0196)       (0.0076) 
Age 0.00736*** 0.00745*** 0.00753*** 0.00760*** 0.00754*** 0.00291*** 
     (0.0008)     (0.0009)     (0.0009)     (0.0009)     (0.0009)       (0.0003) 
Income -0.0123*** -0.0158*** -0.0161*** -0.0160*** -0.0156*** 0.00602*** 
 
    (0.0039)     (0.0043)     (0.0044)     (0.0044)     (0.0044)       (0.0017) 
       
       
       
Constant -0.604*** -0.666*** -0.730*** -0.811*** -0.806*** 
 
 
      (0.0779)       (0.0833)       (0.0881)       (0.0890)       (0.0902) 
 Observations 32,976 27,939 27,062 26,998 26,544 26,544 
All specifications include indicators for education (secondary education omitted), marital status, employment status, and 
country (USA omitted) of respondent. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results suggest that tax morale is influenced by individual trust in government 
organizations in the output side and specifically those with which individuals are more likely to 
interact. The full-fledged specification (model 5) shows that Trust in Police is statistically 
significant at the one percent level and shows the expected positive sign. Higher trust in police 
makes individuals more likely to report that they would never justify cheating on their taxes.15 
																																																								
15 Several other considerations may be behind the strong results for trust in police. For example, results from 
behavioral experiments indicate that direct, face-to-face communication is superior to other forms of interaction in 
promoting trust and cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). Similarly, experiments in neuroscience show unique physiological 
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The results give additional support to the hypothesis that building a relationship of trust and 
cooperation between taxpayers and authorities would improve individual tax compliance (Alm, 
1999; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). 
Regarding the other Trust in Government variables, none of them is statistically 
significant in the full-fledged specification, although Trust in Civil Service and in Justice and 
Courts show the expected positive sign. Possible reasons for those results may be the lack of 
specificity in the Civil Service case (it may have different meanings for different people) and the 
lack of direct involvement with the courts and the judiciary in the other. Trust in Justice is 
statistically significant only when the two Trust in Government variables that are newly 
proposed in this paper were not included (model 3). From our discussion above, there are reasons 
to expect that Trust in Parliament may not be related to tax morale, in particular if individuals 
associate parliament with incumbent members. Overall, the results support our hypothesis that 
individuals assess whether to trust government by the way its agencies exercise their powers over 
the citizenry. In other words, they assess government legitimacy by the way it exercises its 
power over its citizens (Rothstein, 2009; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). 
For the other control variables, the results show that support for democratic regimes 
affects the willingness to comply with taxes. Those individuals who reject non-democratic 
alternatives are more likely to report willingness to comply with taxes; this variable has the 
expected positive sign and it is statistically significant at the one percent level. Even though the 
results we obtain are similar to those from earlier studies, the measure of democratic support 
used in this paper accounts for the problems with measures of overt support - simultaneous 
support for democracy coexisting with support for regimes that are not democratic. The results 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
patterns – brain activity and neurotransmitters - when subjects are trusted (Sanfey, 2007) and also when they are 
mistrusted (Zak et al., 2005). 
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for the other control variables are within expectations. Both religiosity and national pride are 
positive and statistically significant – higher religious values and pride in one’s national origin 
are associated with higher tax morale. Women are more likely to exhibit higher tax morale than 
men, and the same holds for older individuals compared to younger ones. 
One limitation of Probit estimation is that unlike linear regression - where the coefficients 
of the independent variables give the size of the impact on the dependent variable - Probit 
coefficients report the change in the z-score of the dependent variable of a one-unit change in the 
independent variable, holding other explanatory variables at pre-determined values. For that 
reason, we computed marginal effects measuring the change in the probability of reporting tax 
morale of a unit change in the independent variables, holding all other variables constant at their 
means (the last column in Table 3). For our variable of interest, one unit increase in Trust in 
Police increases the probability of reporting tax morale by about two percentage points. 
Although the size of the impact is arguably small, it is otherwise in line with earlier results. The 
impact of individual support for democracy on willingness to comply with taxes is larger; those 
who reject all non-democratic regime alternatives are about seven percent more likely to report 
tax morale than those who support at least one non-democratic regime. Similarly, an increase of 
one point in national pride increases the probability of reporting tax morale by about six percent, 
holding all other variables at their means. The impact of religiosity is also positive, but smaller 
still - about one percent. The small impact of religiosity echoes Dalton’s (1996) observation that 
religious affiliation is losing its relevance in providing individuals with guidance about political 
issues. Females are more likely to report tax morale by about five percentage points compared to 
males that are otherwise average in all other respects. Finally, older individuals are more likely 
to report tax morale than younger ones.  
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Table 4. Trust In Government and Tax Morale - Partial-Free and Not-Free Countries 
      
Marginal 
Effects   1 2 3 4 5 
Justice and Courts 
  
0.0490** 
 
0.0463** 0.0181** 
   
(0.0195) 
 
(0.0234) (0.0092) 
Parliament 
  
-0.0075 
 
0.0030 0.0012 
   
(0.0209) 
 
(0.0241) (0.0094) 
Civil Service 
   
0.0013 -0.0151 -0.0059 
    
(0.0211) (0.0242) (0.0095) 
Police 
   
0.0310 0.0084 0.0033 
    
(0.0198) (0.0239) (0.0094) 
Support for Democracy 
 
0.201*** 0.197*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.0797*** 
  
(0.0325) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0133) 
National Pride 0.250*** 0.263*** 0.232*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.0922*** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0230) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0104) 
Religiosity (attendance to services) 0.0315*** 0.0240*** 0.0112 0.0096 0.0099 0.0039 
 
(0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0036) 
Gender (female) 0.0225 0.0057 0.0004 0.0009 0.0012 0.0005 
 
(0.0262) (0.0299) (0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0128) 
Age 0.00255** 0.00206* 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0004 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0006) 
Income -0.0474*** -0.0384*** -0.0391*** -0.0421*** -0.0399*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0031) 
Constant -0.0879 -0.1060 -0.0525 -0.0131 -0.0655 
 
 
(0.1050) (0.1180) (0.1370) (0.1370) (0.1400) 
 Observations 14,707 11,783 8,496 8,428 8,279 8,279 
All specifications include indicators for education (secondary education omitted), marital status, employment status, and 
country (Turkey omitted) of respondent. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
We also perform some heterogeneity analysis. Table 4 presents the estimation results for 
respondents living in nine countries whose regimes either fall short of being full-fledged 
democracies or are a different type of political regime. As explained earlier, we have separated 
the WVS sample between democratic countries and the rest because democratic regimes may 
build trust in their citizens in ways that non-democratic regimes cannot (e.g. by allowing 
individuals to express their voice regarding the policies they want enacted). For instance, 
allowing individuals to express their policy views may make taxpayers trust political 
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organizations of government that may not be trusted (or be trusted under different basis) in those 
regimes that are not democratic.  
Talking specifically about the results, support for the proposition that government 
institutions in the output side are what drive tax morale is verified, although the results differ 
from those obtained for individuals from democratic countries. The most notable difference is 
that Trust in Police is not statistically significant though the sign of the coefficient was as 
expected. By contrast, Trust in Justice is statistically significant at the five percent level and 
shows the expected positive sign; the higher the level of trust the more likely respondents to 
report that cheating on taxes is never justifiable (holding all other variables at their means). From 
the input side, neither trust in Parliament (which in earlier studies positively influenced tax 
morale) nor trust in the Civil Service (one of the measures we propose) is statistically significant. 
However, Probit coefficients only tell the direction of the relationship and not its intensity so we 
also computed marginal effects. Because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we 
computed marginal effects only for the highest value of the tax morale variable – cheating on 
taxes is never justifiable. One point improvement in Trust in Justice increases tax morale of 
respondents by about two percentage points.  
There are several possible reasons behind this difference in results for the two groups of 
countries.  One possibility is that the situation of rights and freedoms in partial-free and not-free 
countries might limit survey respondents’ willingness to report their views to the interviewer for 
fear of reprisals16. However, several arguments lessen the plausibility of such explanation; 
																																																								
16 To illustrate, in Turkey’s country report, Freedom House (2011) noted that although the constitution provided for 
an independent judiciary, in practice the government influenced its decisions, for instance condoning questionable 
practices such as accepting confessions extracted under torture. Also individuals may be incarcerated and prosecuted 
for discussing issues such as the division of Cyprus, the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by Turks, or insulting the 
armed services. Individuals may also be incarcerated and prosecuted for denigrating “Turkishness” (quotes in 
original). As a result of all these issues, the exercise of freedom of speech may well be affected.  
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interviewers do not collect any information that would allow identification of particular 
respondents. Also, limitations in political and civil rights in the “partial-free and not-free 
countries” vary a great deal, and it is not clear why respondents would be less fearful to tell their 
opinions about the Courts and the Legal System (which shows the predicted sign and is 
statistically significant) than their opinions about the Police or about Parliaments.  All these 
observations make it less likely that a fear to speak the truth is a factor explaining the empirical 
results.  
A second reason stems from the possibility that government organizations in democratic 
countries may work differently in partial-free and not-free countries.  Even though their formal 
functions may be similar, differences in the societies’ informal rules (North, 1994) that never 
considered democratic concepts such as individual rights and freedoms for all (O’Donnell, 2001) 
would end up making those institutions work differently compared to those in democratic 
countries.  As a result, taxpayers in “partial-free” and “not-free countries” may not have the same 
expectations regarding those organizations compared with their counterparts in democratic 
countries. Finally, the police may be perceived as the most visible instrument of government 
repression with little variation across “partial-free” and “not-free” countries while the judiciary 
could be more independent in some cases thus contributing to explain differences in tax morale. 
Regarding the results for the other control variables, support for democracy and national 
pride appear associated with higher probability of reporting tax morale. Both coefficients have 
the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The marginal 
effect indicates that those rejecting all non-democratic government alternatives are about eight 
percent more likely to report higher tax morale than those who do support at least one non-
democratic alternative, but are otherwise average in all other respects. Likewise, one point 
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increase in national pride increases the likelihood of reporting tax morale by about nine percent 
(other things being average). Given that in this group of countries governments either fall short 
of being democratic or do not resemble a democratic system at all, we would have expected 
some kind of alignment between regime preferences and the current regime on the one hand, and 
willingness to comply with taxes on the other. Willingness to comply with taxes is one sure way 
to contribute to the sustainability of the preferred regime. The way we constructed the support 
for democracy variable would allow for collecting the preferences of those who support non-
democratic systems to exhibit tax morale (the value 0 means that at least one non-democratic 
regime is preferred), but what we see is that rejection of non-democratic regime alternatives 
appear associated with higher willingness to comply with taxes.  
For the other control variables, religious beliefs, gender, and age do not affect the 
willingness to comply with taxes. Religiosity and age are only statistically significant in the 
models without the trust in government and democratic support variables, whereas gender is 
never statistically significant. In any event, none of those factors may be influenced by 
government action and so if they were relevant it would be more like parameters or restrictions 
on what governments may do about influencing other tax morale factors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In recent years scholars have shifted their focus to ask what makes people willing to 
comply with taxes beyond the incentives provided by audit probabilities and potential fines 
which were emphasized in the classical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. Considerable 
research has now been conducted verifying the important the role played by tax morale in tax 
compliance behavior (Luttmer and Singhal 2014). This in turn has led to asking the question of 
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what shapes tax morale. In this paper we have argued that trust in government and therefore the 
willingness to pay taxes is affected by the way citizens are treated when interacting with 
government institutions in the regular delivery of public goods and services. The evidence 
available from other fields strongly supports the argument that trust plays a fundamental role in 
fostering cooperation among individuals, and thus provides independent support for the 
hypothesized mechanism for building tax morale– trust emerges out of direct contact between 
individuals.  We empirically test the propositions that individuals who trust government are more 
likely to exhibit higher tax morale and that trust in the output organizations of government in 
particular is even more likely to increase tax morale. For the empirical estimation we use data 
from over thirty countries covered in the 2005-2007 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). 
Our empirical results suggest that tax morale is influenced by individual trust in government 
organizations especially on the output side. These are the government organizations with which 
individuals are more likely to interact. The results are particularly strong for the subset of “free 
countries” while generally weaker for the “partial-free” and “not-free” countries. From the 
results we may draw some lessons. 
First, the results in this paper are consistent with the recommendation in the tax 
compliance literature that building a relationship of trust and cooperation between taxpayers and 
tax authorities is necessary to elicit voluntary tax compliance (e.g. Braithwaite, 2003; Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Furthermore, the results in this paper suggest the need to expand that 
recommendation to all the output organizations of government (and not only where taxpayers 
meet tax authorities) because individuals who trust those output organizations are more likely to 
reciprocate and become more willing to comply with their tax obligations and government norms 
in general. 
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Second, tax administration reform should be just one part of a broader reform in the 
public sector to bring governance in line with more government horizontal accountability or the 
extent to which government agencies are legally and factually able to exercise control on one 
another and impose sanctions or mandate redress of state power abuses (O’Donnell 1998, 2004). 
If individuals are at the mercy of government agents that demand bribes in exchange for goods 
and services individuals are entitled to get, impose sanctions that may not be appealed, or even 
worse, possibly imprison individuals without due process or subject them to torture, horizontal 
accountability is severely undermined and citizens cannot be expected to voluntarily comply 
with taxes or support other government activities. Building a professional and impartial 
bureaucracy may be a good step in building trust in government and in fellow citizens 
(Rothstein, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). 
Third, the differences in in our results between “free’ versus “partial-free” and “not-free” 
countries leads us to consider several implications for policy reform. Because of differences in 
how government institutions work in democratic and not democratic countries, the effectiveness 
of tax reforms developed and implemented on the basis of what has worked in democratic 
countries would appear to be open to question. On the one hand, some technical elements of 
reform may improve individual compliance with taxes, provided taxpayers are asked to do what 
lies within their abilities and are p supported by the authorities. On the other hand, creating an 
atmosphere of trust between taxpayers and authorities to replace the old paradigm of command 
and control would seem difficult to achieve where government bureaucrats have little restraint on 
how they exercise their power over the citizenry. Priority should be given to reforming 
government organizations in the output side and specifically those with which individuals are 
more likely to interact.	
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